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International law is not the most perfect legal regime, and, perhaps to
no one’s surprise, it is even less perfect in cyberspace. The United States has
been a victim to a series of malicious cyber operations in recent years, and
the key question is how to respond to and deter them. This Article offers a
detailed survey of the Russian interference in the 2016 presidential election
in the context of international law. Adapting the framework created by
Tallinn Manual 2.0, the Article examines the international legal basis of the
response measures employed by the United States and other possible
alternative responses to the Russian operation. It concludes that none of
these responses are both squarely supported by international law and
desirable as a matter of national security police. This Article intends to show
that international law contains considerable gray areas in the cyber realm
that allow sophisticated adversaries like Russia to harm the core interest of
the United States without substantial legal repercussions. The Article
concludes by suggesting that a deterrence mechanism based on proactive
national security policy would be more effective and practical than one
based on international law.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Following the 2016 presidential election, the United States intelligence
community found evidence of election meddling operations in the
cyberspace linked to the Russian government.1 The possibility that the
Russian State compromised the integrity of the democratic process incited a
great amount of fear and anger. Then Chairman of the Senate Armed
Services Committee, Senator John McCain, called the Russian meddling an
“act of war.”2 John Brennan, then Director of the Central Intelligence
Agency, also emphasized that an attempt to influence the election process is
a “very, very serious matter.”3
In response to the operation, both the Obama and Trump
Administrations have imposed economic sanctions on the Russian entities
involved4 and indicted numerous Russian individuals who played a role in
election interference.5 Due to the seriousness of the issue, many
commentators are not satisfied with how the United States responded to
Russia. Some, like Harvard Law Professor Jack Goldsmith, simply criticized
the United States’ lack of deterrence policy in cyberspace;6 others went a
step further, calling for fiercer responses than the ones employed.7 Although
1. Press Release, White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Statement by the President on
Actions in Response to Russian Malicious Cyber Activity and Harassment (Dec. 29, 2016),
https://perma.cc/3XXD-8K5C; OFF. OF THE DIR. OF NAT’L INTELLIGENCE, ASSESSING RUSSIAN
ACTIVITIES AND INTENTIONS IN RECENT US ELECTIONS (2017), https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/
ICA_2017_01.pdf [hereinafter ODNI REPORT].
2. Theodore Schliefer & Deidre Walsh, McCain: Russian Cyberintrusions an Act of War,’ CNN
(Dec. 30, 2016), https://www.cnn.com/2016/12/30/politics/mccain-cyber-hearing/.
3. THE ASPEN INST., ASPEN SECURITY FORUM 2016: A CANDID CONVERSATION WITH THE
DIRECTOR OF THE CIA 29 (2016), https://perma.cc/XU94-KEYY.
4. The White House, Fact Sheet: Actions in Response to Russian Malicious Cyber Activity and
Harassment, THE WHITE HOUSE: PRESIDENT BARACK OBAMA (Dec. 29, 2016),
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/12/29/fact-sheet-actions-response-russianmalicious-cyber-activity-and.
5. See Peter Baker, White House Penalizes Russians over Election Meddling and Cyberattacks,
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 15, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/15/us/politics/trump-russiasanctions.html; Gardiner Harris, Trump Administration Imposes New Sanctions on Putin Cronies, N.Y.
TIMES (Apr. 6, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/06/us/politics/trump-sanctions-russia-putinoligarchs.html.
6. Jack Goldsmith, The DNC Hack and (the Lack of) Deterrence, LAWFARE (Oct. 9, 2016),
https://www.lawfareblog.com/dnc-hack-and-lack-deterrence.
7. See, e.g., Julia Manchester, Dem Calls Russia Meddling ‘Act of War,’ Urges Cyber Attack on
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these demands for a stronger response might serve the country’s sentiment
of undergoing a direct attack on the democratic system, they do not have a
solid basis under international law.
This Article offers a detailed analysis of the Russian interference in the
2016 election in the context of international law. It examines the
international legal basis of the response measures employed by the United
States and other possible alternative responses to the Russian operation. I
argue that none of the three alternative measures examined are plainly
applicable as a matter of international law, nor are they desirable as a matter
of policy, mainly because of the great uncertainty that the current
international law carries. I conclude the Article by arguing that a deterrence
mechanism, based on policy instead of international law, would be more
effective and practical.
II. CONTEXT OF THE 2016 RUSSIAN ELECTION MEDDLING
OPERATION
The January 2017 report published by the Office of the Director of
National Intelligence (“ODNI Report”) is one of the most authoritative
declassified reports on Russian interference in the 2016 election.8 With high
confidence,9 the report attributes the Russian election meddling operation to
President Vladimir Putin himself.10 The report also states that the operation
was intended to “undermine public faith in the U.S. democratic process,
denigrate Secretary Hillary Clinton, and harm her electability and potential
presidency.”11
Notably, the Russian election meddling operation had multiple
components.12 The three major components are the following: The first and
most publicly-reported part is its hacking-and-releasing campaign against
the Democratic National Committee (“DNC”) in March 2016,13 launched by
a Russian military intelligence agency known as the General Staff Main

Moscow Banks, THE HILL (July 17, 2018), https://thehill.com/hilltv/rising/397366-dem-rep-no-questionthat-russia-hacking-effort-is-act-of-war (Rep. Steve Cohen (D-Tenn.) calling for cyber counter attack that
would make “Russian Society valueless”); Mark Hertling & Molly K. Mckew, Putin’s Attack on the U.S.
Is Our Pearl Harbor, POLITICO MAGAZINE (July 16, 2018), https://www.politico.com/
magazine/story/2018/07/16/putin-russia-trump-2016-pearl-harbor-219015
(calling
for
more
consequential response to deter further attacks).
8. ODNI REPORT, supra note 1.
9. High confidence normally indicates that the judgment is confirmed by “high-quality
information from multiple sources,” although it does not imply certainty. Id. at 13.
10. Id. at ii.
11. Id. at 2.
12. Id. at 1.
13. Id.
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Intelligence Directorate (“GRU”).14 The GRU hacked into the personal email
accounts of DNC officials by infiltrating the DNC servers and selectively
released the information gathered to multiple outlets, including Guccifer 2.0
persona, DCLeaks.com, and WikiLeaks.15 In the entire process of the
hacking-and-release campaign, no property, including servers or personal
computing devices, was damaged in any way.16 Simultaneously, Russia’s
state-controlled media, RT and Sputnik, started to run a propaganda
campaign supporting then-presidential-candidate Trump in its English
content.17
Finally, a non-government entity closely tied to Russian intelligence,
the Internet Research Agency (“IRA”), initiated a social media campaign
during the 2016 presidential election.18 The IRA spent over two million
dollars purchasing anti-Clinton and pro-Trump advertisements on major
social media platforms, including Twitter, Facebook, and Instagram.19 On
these platforms, hundreds of fake accounts were created to interact with
voters.20 Across platforms, the IRA created and used more than 120 groups
and social media “troll” accounts during the election meddling operation.21
Each part of this operation had different international law implications.
I will now discuss, given what we know about the Russian operation, what
international law options the United States has in response.
III. LEGAL ANALYSIS IN THE CONTEXT OF TALLINN MANUAL 2.0
This note primarily relies on Tallinn Manual 2.0 on the International
Law Applicable to Cyber Operations (hereinafter “Tallinn Manual 2.0”) as
well as its academic critique and commentary to examine different
international law response measures available to the United States
government. Published in 2017, Tallinn Manual 2.0 is an expansion of its
previous 2013 version, Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable

14. Id.
15. Id. at 2–3.
16. Id. at 2
17. Id. at 3–4.
18. Id. at 4.
19. See Oliver Carroll, St. Petersburg “Troll Farm” Had 90 Dedicated Staff Working to Influence
US Election Campaign, INDEPENDENT (Oct. 17, 2017), https://perma.cc/BL34-WK9F (discussing the
IRA’s operations and funding).
20. See Scott Shane, The Fake Americans Russia Created to Influence the Election, N.Y. TIMES
(Sept. 7, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/07/us/politics/russia-facebook-twitter-election.html
(discussing the IRA’s use of fake social media accounts).
21. Michael N. Schmitt, “Virtual” Disenfranchisement: Cyber Election Meddling in the Grey
Zones of International Law, 19 CHI. J. INT’L L. 30, 35 (2018) [hereinafter Schmitt, “Virtual”
Disenfranchisement].
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to Cyber Operations.22 Created by an independent group of international law
experts from twenty nations (“Tallinn Manual 2.0 experts”),23 Tallinn
Manual 2.0 examines customary international law applicable in the context
of conflicts in cyberspace and is the most comprehensive treatise available
in this area.
Tallinn Manual 2.0 provides four major categories of responses to
States facing hostile cyber operations: (1) self-defense, (2) the plea of
necessity, (3) countermeasures, and (4) retorsion.24 The availability of each
response to a victim State depends on the different levels of hostile operation
the victim State underwent.25 This section will first examine retorsion, which
is the international legal foundation of the response measures actually
employed by the United States in response to the Russian election meddling
operation. It will then discuss the possible alternative options for the United
States: self-defense, the plea of necessity, and countermeasures. I conclude
that, in the case of the Russian interference in the 2016 election, none of the
three alternative response measures is warranted as a matter of international
law and desirable as a matter of policy.
A. Retorsion
Following Russia’s operation to influence the 2016 Presidential
Election, the Obama administration responded by imposing sanctions on
several Russian governmental and private organizations involved in the
operation, as well as expelling dozens of Russian government officials by
declaring them “persona non grata,” or, literally, “person not appreciated.”26
In March 2018, the Trump administration also imposed further sanctions on
Russian oligarchs, governmental agencies, and Russian individuals involved
in these cyber operations.27
The Obama and Trump Administrations’ responses to the Russian

22. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0 ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER OPERATIONS, at
xxiii (Michael N. Schmitt ed., 2d ed. 2017) [hereinafter TALLINN MANUAL 2.0].
23. See id. at 5 (discussing membership of the International Groups of Experts and the drafting
process).
24. See generally Michael N. Schmitt, Peacetime Cyber Responses and Wartime Cyber Operations
Under International Law: An Analytical Vade Mecum, 8 HARV. NAT’L SEC. J. 239 (2017) [hereinafter
Vade Mecum]. See also Sean Watts, International Law and Proposed U.S. Responses to the D.N.C. Hack,
JUST SEC. (Oct. 14, 2016), https://perma.cc/Q8L5-C432 (discussing potential U.S. responses to Russia).
25. Vade Mecum, supra note 24, at 244.
26. The White House, Fact Sheet, supra note 4.
27. Peter Baker, White House Penalizes Russians over Election Meddling and Cyberattacks, N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 15, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/15/us/politics/trump-russia-sanctions.html;
Gardiner Harris, Trump Administration Imposes New Sanctions on Putin Cronies, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 6,
2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/06/us/politics/trump-sanctions-russia-putin-oligarchs.html.
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operation fall into the category of “retorsion” under international law.28
Retorsion is a hostile but lawful measure against another State.29 Economic
sanctions and expulsion of diplomatic personnel are classic examples of
retorsion,30 both of which are hostile against another State but within the
power of a sovereign State.31 Before a State employs retorsion measures
against another State, the former does not need to establish that the later has
committed an internationally wrongful act, such as prohibited intervention.32
Retorsion does not create any breach of international legal obligation and is,
therefore, the mildest response measure that Tallinn Manual 2.0 provides for
States to respond to a hostile cyber operation.
The Obama Administration’s use of retorsion as a response to the
Russian hack implies two possibilities. Either the Administration believed
that establishing the Russian government had committed an internationally
wrongful act would be difficult or, alternatively, the Administration decided
the mildest level of retaliation available was more desirable, even if such a
case could be made. The following analysis will demonstrate that both
reasons may be true by examining the alternative legal options in response
to the Russian operation. I will first discuss the law regarding self-defense.
B. Alternative Legal Options: Self-Defense
After the reports of the Russian hack came out, many commentators
started to call this effort to meddle with the U.S. elections an “act of war,”
urging strong retaliatory measures.33 Some even compared the hacking to
some of the most devastating attacks in U.S. history, such as the Japanese
attack on Pearl Harbor and the September 11 terrorist attack.34 Equating
28. Schmitt, “Virtual” Disenfranchisement, supra note 21, at 64; see also Vade Mecum, supra note
24, at 258.
29. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 22, at 112.
30. Schmitt, “Virtual” Disenfranchisement, supra note 21, at 64.
31. Id. at 64 n.160 (“As noted by Professor Sean Murphy in his Statement of Defense of the United
States, ‘every state has the right to grant or deny foreign assistance, to permit or deny exports, to grant or
deny loans or credits, and to grant or deny participation in national procurement or financial management,
on such terms as it finds appropriate.”); Statement of Defense of the United States at 57, Islamic Public
of Iran v. United States of America, Claim No. A/30 (Iran-United States Claims Tribunal 1996),
https://perma.cc/W92E-3LLM.
32. See Schmitt, “Virtual” Disenfranchisement, supra note 21, at 64 (“The cyber operations to
which an act of retorsion responds need not constitute an internationally wrongful act, although they
may.”); see also Vade Mecum, supra note 24, at 258.
33. See, e.g., Manchester, supra note 7 (for coverage of the remarks of Rep. Steve Cohen (DTenn.)); Michelangelo Signorile, Russia Committed An Act Of War And Trump Won’t Talk About It,
HUFFINGTON POST (July 16, 2018), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/opinion-signorile-russianhacking_us_5b4b6a09e4b022fdcc5a3aa3 (arguing that Russia committed an “act of war” against the
United States).
34. Mark Hertling & Molly K. McKew, Putin’s Attack on the U.S. Is Our Pearl Harbor, POLITICO
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Russia’s hacking to a kinetic attack (traditional, regular military attack), for
example, the bombing of Pearl Harbor, carries great international law
significance because this characterization could potentially permit the
United States to respond to Russia in the form of self-defense.
Self-defense is the one alternative response measure the United States
might consider using in light of a harmful operation. The United Nations
Charter prohibits Member States from engaging in any “threat or use of force
against . . . any [other] state,”35 unless under authorization of the Security
Council under Article 39 or, under Article 51, in “self-defence if an armed
attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations. . . .”36 The State’s
right to engage in self-defense under jus ad bellum, the right to war, has not
only been entrenched in the United Nations Charter,37 but also indisputably
established by customary international law.38 If a harmful cyber operation
has amounted to the level of “armed attack,” the victim State is then entitled,
as a matter of international law, to respond by counter attacks that would
otherwise be prohibited by Section 2(4) of the UN Charter.
The central challenge is defining when a harmful cyber operation rises
to the level of an “armed attack.” Customary international law uses the “scale
and effects” analysis of an operation as a test, but fails to specify further
guidance.39 Hence, customary international law does not provide a practical
bright-line rule for identifying the precise point at which a military operation
amounts to an “armed attack.” The Tallinn Manual 2.0 experts unanimously
agreed that, in the cyber context, the precise line would be unclear too, except
in certain extreme scenarios.40 For example, the Tallinn Manual 2.0 experts
do agree that acts of cyber intelligence gathering and cyber theft, as well as
cyber operations that “involve brief or periodic interruption of non-essential
cyber services, do not qualify as armed attacks[,]” while the operations that
“seriously injur[ ]es or kills a number of persons or that causes significant
damage to, or destruction of, property would satisfy. . . .”41
Tallinn Manual 2.0 experts, however, do not agree whether the 2010
(July 16, 2018), https://politico.com/magazine/story/2018/07/16/putin-russia-trump-2016-pearl-harbor219015.
35. U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 4.
36. Id. art. 51.
37. Id. (describing the right to self-defense as an “inherent right”).
38. See Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), 2003 I.C.J. 161, ¶¶ 51, 74, 76 (Nov. 6); Legality of the Threat
or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226, ¶ 41 (July 8); Vade Mecum, supra note
24, at 244 n.8 (citing Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. US), 1986
I.C.J. 14, ¶¶ 176, 194 (June 27) [hereinafter Nicaragua]).
39. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 22, r. 71.
40. Id.
41. Id.
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Stuxnet operation, where a malicious computer malware was used to halt the
Iranian nuclear program and ended up disabling thousands of centrifuges
Iran used to purify uranium,42 meets the “armed attack” threshold,43 despite
the fact that, arguably, a significant amount of property was damaged as one
would see in a kinetic attack.44
Even when there is no physical harm to persons or physical damage to
property, the Tallinn Manual 2.0 experts are divided on whether there can be
an incident characterized as an armed attack.45 Some argue that it is not the
destructive nature, but the extent of the ensuing effects that matter.46 A cyber
operation directed to cause a market crash at a major stock market would be
a classic example that divides the two camps.47
The legal analysis of the condition precedent for self-defense is an even
more complicated one for the United States. The United States holds the
minority view that the threshold for an armed attack is identical to that of a
prohibited use of force,48 while customary international law sees only the
“gravest forms of the use of force” as an armed attack.49 This means that the
United States reserves the flexibility to respond not only to armed attacks,
but also to illegal uses of force, by imposing measures that fall into the selfdefense category.50
42. David E. Sanger, Obama Order Sped Up Wave of Cyberattacks Against Iran, N.Y. TIMES (June
1, 2012), https://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/01/world/middleeast/obama-ordered-wave-of-cyberattacksagainst-iran.html.
43. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 22, at 342.
44. Some have argued this would be enough. See, e.g., James G. Stavridis, Incoming: What Is a
Cyber Attack?, SIGNAL MAG. (Jan. 1, 2015), http://www.afcea.org/content/?q=incoming-what-cyberattack [http://perma.cc/VR8Y-JN75] (“Because Stuxnet produced a destructive effect that we normally
associate with attacks in other domains, there is no argument over whether it constituted a cyber attack.”);
see also Ryan Fairchild, When Can a Hacker Start a War?, PAC. STANDARD (Feb. 6, 2015),
http://www.psmag.com/nature-and-technology/when-cyber-attack-constitutes-act-of-war
[http://perma.cc/S2MQ-8AAD] (arguing that “Stuxnet would have qualified as an armed attack”).
45. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 22, at 341–42.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. DEP’T OF DEF., DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE LAW OF WAR MANUAL pt. 16.3.3.1, at 1017 (2016)
(citing Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Adviser, Department of State, International Law in Cyberspace:
Remarks as Prepared for Delivery to the USCYBERCOM Inter-Agency Legal Conference (Sept. 18,
2012), in 54 HARV. INT’L L. J. ONLINE 7 (Dec. 2012) (“To cite just one example of this, the United States
has for a long time taken the position that the inherent right of self-defense potentially applies against any
illegal use of force. In our view, there is no threshold for a use of deadly force to qualify as an “armed
attack” that may warrant a forcible response. But that is not to say that any illegal use of force triggers
the right to use any and all force in response—such responses must still be necessary and of course
proportionate.”)).
49. See Nicaragua, supra note 38, ¶ 191.
50. This flexibility could create an advantage for the United States, because since the Caroline
incident, customary international law allows operations for self-defense purposes to be anticipatory,
rather than reactive if the state can show that an attack is imminent, which might grant the United States
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The accurate legal standard for what acts amount to a use of force, but
not an armed attack, carries great uncertainty.51 The Tallinn Manual 2.0
experts agreed that, in the cyber realm, the customary “scale and effects”
standard for determining what amounts to an armed attack should also apply
when determining which acts amounts to a use of force,”52 which, again,
does not provide much practical value.
The Tallinn Manual 2.0 experts have reached a consensus on only a few
cases. For example, on the one end, Tallinn Manual 2.0 experts unanimously
categorized the Stuxnet incident as a use of force.53 On the other end, they
also agreed that neither psychological operations in cyberspace only seeking
to weaken confidence in a government, nor a ban on e-commerce intended
to undermine the victim state’s economy, amount to uses of force.54 The
Tallinn Manual 2.0 experts also drew an analogy to the International Court
of Justice’s (“ICJ”) Nicaragua opinion, asserting that “a State that provides
an organized armed group with malware and the training necessary to carry
out cyber operations against another State has engaged in a use of force
against the latter” as long as the supported operations themselves rise to a
use of force.55
Given the great elusiveness of the use of force standard, the Tallinn
Manual 2.0 experts provide an open list of factors that States are likely to
use in assessing whether a cyber operation has reached the level of a use of
force:56
1. Severity: the level of harm inflicted on individuals and
property, measured by the scope, duration, and intensity of the
consequences. The Tallinn Manual 2.0 experts believe severity
is the most important factor in categorizing cyber operations.
2. Immediacy: the more immediate the effects caused by the
cyber operation, the more likely such an operation amounts to
a use of force.
3. Directness: the more direct the causal link between the
the first-hand advantage in a military conflict. See Letter from Daniel Webster to Lord Ashburton (July
27, 1842), http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/br-1842d.asp; see also William H. Taft, IV,
International Law and the Use of Force, 36 GEO. J. INT’L L. 659, 659–60 (2005) (stating that state’s right
to use force before an imminent attack is well-established).
51. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 22, at 330 (stating the United Nation Charter does not
provide specific criteria determining what actions rise to the illegal use of force).
52. Id.
53. Id. at 342.
54. Id. at 331.
55. Id. at 332 (citing Nicaragua, supra note 38) (judgment that arming and training a guerrilla force
that is engaged in hostilities against another State qualified as a use of force).
56. Id. at 334.
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operation and its consequences, the more likely such an
operation amounts to a use of force.
4. Invasiveness: the more classified and protected the targeted
system is, the more invasive the operation, and, therefore, the
more likely such an operation amounts to a use of force.
5. Measurability of effects: the more quantifiable and
identifiable the effects of a cyber operation are—e.g. the
amount of data corrupted, the percentage of server disabled,
etc.—the more likely that a State would characterize it as a use
of force.
6. Military character: the more military involvement, the more
likely an operation is characterized as a use of force.
7. State involvement: the clearer and closer a nexus between a
State and cyber operations, the more likely an operation rises
to a use of force.
8. Presumptive legality: certain acts are not prohibited by
international law per se, including propaganda, psychological
operations, espionage, or mere economic pressure. If a cyber
operation falls into any of these categories, it is less likely to
amount to a use of force.
Except for severity, none of the aforementioned factors are likely
sufficient to justify categorizing a cyber operation as a use of force on their
own.57 Although this rubric offers a more expanded definition of a use of
force, applying it real-time to the effects of a still-developing operation may
prove difficult.58 It is useful, however, for this Article’s analysis on the DNC
hack.
The Russian election meddling operation cannot be categorized as an
armed attack under the framework of Tallinn Manual 2.0 because no
physical damages were inflicted on persons or objects. This operation is a
much weaker case under the current international law framework than that
of the Stuxnet operation, where physical property––thousands of Iranian
centrifuges––was damaged and disabled.59 If the Tallinn Manual 2.0 experts
could not reach a consensus on whether Stuxnet qualified as an armed attack,
the DNC hack is even more unlikely to be considered as such.
57. Michael N. Schmitt, Grey Zones in the International Law of Cyberspace, 42 YALE INT’L L.J.
ONLINE 1, 14 (Oct. 18, 2017), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3180687 [hereinafter Schmitt, Grey Zones].
58. Priyanka R. Dev, “Use of Force” and “Armed Attack” Thresholds in Cyber Conflict: the
Looming Definitional Gaps and the Growing Need for Formal U.N. Response, 50 TEX. INT’L L.J. 381,
391 (2015).
59. See Ryan Fairchild, When Can a Hacker Start a War?, PAC. STANDARD (Feb. 6, 2015),
http://www.psmag.com/nature-and-technology/when-cyber-attack-constitutes-act-of-war.
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The “scale and effects” analysis is even more unlikely to qualify the
DNC hack as an armed attack.60 Although the Mueller investigation and
indictments against Russian individuals have provided much more
information, the actual effects of the hack are still almost unmeasurable.61
The way that the Russian election interference operated in influencing the
information environment––essentially spreading narratives and messages
that were false but also subscribed to by certain American groups, such as
the subscribers of Infowars––made it hard for analysts to figure out (1) which
parts of the information environment before the 2016 election was created
by Russian trolls and (2) which parts originated in the United States.
Categorizing the Russian DNC hack as an armed attack might also
invite an escalation of cyber conflict by triggering Article 5 of the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (“NATO”) Charter,62 which calls for a
collective response from all NATO States. It could alienate NATO partners
to put the entirety of NATO in a confrontation with Russia over an election
meddling operation that caused no physical damage. After all, Estonia, even
after suffering a much stronger attack from Russia in 2007 that temporarily
disabled a large percentage of its Internet system, did not invoke Chapter 5
for these considerations.63
Under Tallinn Manual 2.0 standards, the DNC attack is also unlikely to
qualify as a use of force for two reasons. First, on its face, the Russian
operation is closer to “non-destructive cyber psychological operations
intended solely to undermine confidence in a government,”64 which does not
constitute a use of force, than the Stuxnet operation, which, again caused
damages on a large amount of State property.
Second, the “scale and effect” factors drawn from Tallinn Manual 2.0
also support the same conclusion that the Russian operation does not
constitute a use of force:
1. Severity: Weak. No harm or damages were inflicted on people
or property.
2. Immediacy: Strong. The effects of the DNC hack were
immediately felt by the United States electorate in a heated
60. See TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 22, r. 71.
61. See Molly Mckew, Did Russia Affect the 2016 Election? It’s Now Undeniable, WIRED (Feb. 16
2018), https://www.wired.com/story/did-russia-affect-the-2016-election-its-now-undeniable/.
62. North Atlantic Treaty art. 5, Apr. 4, 1949, 63 Stat. 2241, 34 U.N.T.S. 243.
63. Ryan J. Hayward, Evaluating the “Imminence” of a Cyber Attack for Purposes of Anticipatory
Self-defense, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 407, 411 (2017); see also Emily Tamkin, 10 Years After the
Landmark Attack on Estonia, Is the World Better Prepared for Cyber Threats?, FOREIGN POLICY (Apr.
27, 2017), https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/04/27/10-years-after-the-landmark-attack-on-estonia-is-theworld-better-prepared-for-cyber-threats/.
64. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 22, at 331.
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election.
3. Directness: Strong. Although the actual effects of the DNC
hack are extremely hard to quantify, one can certainly argue
that the DNC emails disclosed after the hack directly influenced
certain voters’ behaviors in the 2016 elections.
4. Invasiveness: Weak. No target in this operation is a protected
or classified system by the United States government. The
DNC is a private organization and it uses its servers to promote
the mission of the Democratic Party. The Russians never
attacked the voting system itself or any government entities
related to the election.
5. Measurability of effects: Weak. We are able to measure how
much information the Russians stole. However, no data or
servers were actually corrupted or damaged. The Russians
selectively disseminated the information they gathered for
political gain without using physically destructive means.
Collecting information, despite via illegal means under United
States domestic law, does not by itself violate international
law.65
6. Military character: Strong. The Central Intelligence Agency
and the Federal Bureau of Investigation found with a high
degree of confidence that Russian military intelligence units
were behind the operation.66 The GRU hacked into the personal
email accounts of Democratic Party officials and distributed the
information gathered.
7. State involvement: Strong. For the same reason mentioned
above, State involvement is extremely close to this operation.
The attack did not come from a private organization supported
by the Russian government, but from the military intelligence
agency itself.
8. Presumptive legality: Unclear. International law does not
provide an answer on this question because scholars are still
arguing whether what the Russians did during the 2016
Election was a psychological operation through cyber
espionage, which is legal under international law, or something
more severe.67 This factor would not help us answer the
65. See id. at r. 32 (espionage does not violate international law).
66. ODNI REPORT, supra note 1, at 13.
67. Compare Steven J. Barela, Zero Shades of Grey: Russian-Ops Violate International Law, JUST
SECURITY (Mar. 29, 2018), https://www.justsecurity.org/54340/shades-grey-russian-ops-violateinternational-law/, with Ram Sachs, Hacking the Election, YALE INT’L L. J. ONLINE (Oct. 28, 2016),
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question of whether the Russian operation constitutes a use of
force because, in this case, the characterization of the Russian
operation is the most important question that needs to be
answered.
Although some of the Tallinn Manual 2.0 factors seem to support
categorizing the Russian Hack as a use of force, the most important factor in
the analysis––the severity of the effects caused by the cyber operation––does
not. The non-violent nature of the operation makes a use of force
categorization extremely difficult. Being able to attribute a cyber operation
that had certain unquantifiable effects on the 2016 elections to the Russian
government does not seem to raise the operation to the level of a use of force
because it would not effectively distinguish this operation from other lower
level offenses under international law, such as prohibited intervention, which
will be discussed in later parts of this Article.
One way to increase the severity of the effects of the Russian operation
as a matter of law would be categorizing the election system as “critical
infrastructures”68 and treating meddling with the elections akin to tampering
with a major dam or an electrical grid. However, the DNC servers are not
related to the election itself, but are instead used to promote the interest of a
private organization, the Democratic Party. Therefore, even if the election
system is categorized as a critical infrastructure as a matter of law, Congress
must go the extra mile to consider ways to protect private entities like the
DNC to respond to cyber operations like the DNC hack in the future. Either
way, classifying the election system as critical infrastructure was unavailable
for both the Obama and the Trump Administrations because such
classification was not in place before the Russian operation.
Self-defense would not have been a measure available to the United
States to respond to the Russian DNC hack in 2016. This is because the
operation amounts to neither an armed attack nor a use of force under
customary international law, as reflected in Tallinn Manual 2.0. The Russian
operation, however, could have been categorized as violating other aspects
of international law, to which the United States may respond by either
invoking the plea of necessity69 or imposing countermeasures.70 I will next
discuss the legal requirements and the applicability of invoking the plea of
necessity.
http://www.yjil.yale.edu/hacking-the-election/#_ftnref7.
68. See generally Eric Jensen, Computer Attacks on Critical National Infrastructure, 38 STAN. J.
INT’L L. 207, 209 (2002); Scott J. Shackelford et al., Making Democracy Harder to Hack, 50 U. MICH.
J. L. REFORM 629 (2017).
69. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 22, at 135.
70. Id. at 111.
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C. Alternative Legal Options: The Plea of Necessity
Adopting the law of State responsibility,71 Rule 26 of Tallinn Manual
2.0 provides that “[a] State may act pursuant to the plea of necessity in
response to acts that present a grave and imminent peril, whether cyber in
nature or not, to an essential interest when doing so is the sole means of
safeguarding it.”72 Like self-defense, the plea of necessity allows the State to
respond to certain situations with means that would otherwise be a violation
of international law.73 The threshold for the plea of necessity consists of three
elements.
First, the State’s interest that is being infringed must be “essential.” The
Tallinn Manual 2.0 experts note that, absent an internationally accepted
standard, the “determination of whether something is essential is always
contextual,” varying from State to State.74 The Tallinn Manual 2.0 experts
also agreed that States’ unilateral classification of certain State interests as
“critical” is not determinative of the issue as a matter of international law.75
Second, the potential harm to the critical interest identified by the victim
State must also be “grave” and “imminent,” adding requirements of severity
and temporality. The Tallinn Manual 2.0 experts agreed that to be “grave,”
the potential harm must be “especially severe,” undermining “an interest in
a fundamental way, like destroying the interest or rendering it largely
dysfunctional.”76Although the risk of physical damage is not required in
order to meet the gravity requirement, “mere inconvenience, irritation, or
71. See Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, Rep. of the
Int’l Law Comm’n on the Work of Its Fifty-Third Session, U.N. Doc. A/56/10, art. 25 (2001) [hereinafter
Articles on State Responsibility].
72. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 22, at 135.
73. See Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 71, art. 25 (“1. Necessity may not by invoked
by a State as a ground for precluding the wrongfulness of an act not in conformity with an international
obligation of the State unless the act: (a) is the only way for the State to safeguard an essential interest
against a grave and imminent peril; and (b) does not seriously impair an essential interest of the State or
States toward which the obligation exists, or of the international community as a whole. 2. In any case,
necessity may be invoked by a State as a ground for precluding wrongfulness if: (a) the international
obligation in question excludes the possibility.”).
74. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 22, at 135. For example, states tend to classify certain
infrastructures as critical, but in different scopes. Compare CRITICAL FIVE, FORGING A COMMON
UNDERSTANDING
FOR
CRITICAL
INFRASTRUCTURE—SHARED
NARRATIVE
(2014),
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/critical-five-shared-narrative-critical-infrastructure2014-508.pdf [https://perma.cc/HWU3-342S] (Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom,
and the United States in 2014 proposed a common definition of critical infrastructure), with U.N.
Secretary-General, Letter dated Jan. 9, 2015 from the Permanent Representatives of China, Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, the Russian Federation, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan to the United Nations, U.N. Doc.
A/69/723 (Jan. 13, 2015) (proposing an international code of conduct for information security to the
General Assembly).
75. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 22, at 136.
76. Id.
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minor disruption” of the interest will never be sufficient.77
The imminence requirement carries more controversy. Tallinn Manual
2.0 adopts the standard of imminence from the Articles of State
Responsibility, which is a set of international law standards developed and
codified by the International Law Commission, a United Nations task force
of international law experts. The standard states that such imminence must
be “objectively established and not merely apprehended as possible.”78 The
Tallinn Manual 2.0 experts also draw an analogy from the anticipatory selfdefense doctrine, asserting that peril is always imminent when the “window
of opportunity” to prevent the hostile operation is about to close.79
What complicates the matter further is that, as the Tallinn Manual 2.0
experts recognized, customary international law does not only view the
imminence requirement in the temporal sense.80 The Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros
Project judgment of the ICJ held that the imminence requirement is satisfied
even if the harm in question could occur “in the long term,” as long as that
fact did not render the harm “less certain and inevitable.”81 An example
would be a cyber operation targeting a State’s financial system with certain
immediate effects such as a stock market crash, but the loss of confidence in
the long term may be the “grave and imminent” peril that justifies the victim
State to resort to the plea of necessity.82
The Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros interpretation of imminence, however,
raises the issue regarding the requisite degree of certainty of harm that would
justify the disregard of the requirement of the temporal approximate.83
Tallinn Manual 2.0 adopts the reasonableness standard available from the
Articles on State Responsibility, stating that the decision to take the plea of
necessity must be based on evidence “reasonably available at the time.”84 In
addition, a State may only act when it is reasonable for a State in a similar
situation to do the same.85
The third and final requirement for acting pursuant to the plea of

77. Id.
78. Id. at 138 (citing Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 71, art. 25, cmt. 15).
79. Id. at 139.
80. Id. at 138.
81. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 22, at 138 (citing Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v.
Slovk.), Judgment, 1997 I.C.J. 7, ¶ 54 (Sept. 25)).
82. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 22, at 139.
83. Christian Schaller, Beyond Self-Defense and Countermeasures: A Critical Assessment of the
Tallinn Manual’s Conception of Necessity, 95 TEX. L. REV. 1619, 1633–34 (2017).
84. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 22, at 138 (quoting Articles on State Responsibility, supra
note 71, art. 25).
85. Id.
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necessity is that there must not be any other way to address the situation.86
When assessing alternative measures, cost and inconvenience alone are not
decisive factors.87 This means, even when a State is anticipating an attack on
a major infrastructure, if the State can find a viable way to shift the operation
to other infrastructure while resolving the situation, it must do so, rather than
retaliating against the attacker in manners that would violate international
law, such as hacking back.88
Another key limitation on a State invoking the plea of necessity is that
it “may not engage in cyber operations that seriously impair the essential
interests of affected States,”89 rendering them in comparable peril
experienced by the invoker. As Michael Schmitt, the Director of Tallinn
Manual 2.0 Project, pointed out, this is because international law seeks to
balance the rights and obligations of States because they are equal as
sovereigns.90
Despite the limitations, the plea of necessity does provide one key
advantage: a State may resort to the plea of necessity when the attacker
cannot be identified.91 Therefore, the State does not need to attribute a hostile
operation to a State actor nor show that a legal obligation under international
law has been breached in order to initiate a response.92 For example, a victim
State may shut down its cyber connection with the country that houses the
source of the attack without proving the source has any connections with the
government of that country, as long as the victim State deems that the
situation satisfies the requisites of the plea of necessity. The flexibility of the
plea to necessity is, conceptually, extremely useful in the cyber context,
where confident attack attribution is rare and legal categorization uncertain.93
Having outlined the relevant rule, I now discuss whether the plea of
necessity was a measure available and desirable for the U.S. decision-makers
facing the 2016 Russian cyber operation. I conclude that the 2016 Russian
cyber operation does not satisfy the requisites of the plea of necessity as a
matter of international law.
Although there are conceivable arguments supporting the availability
86. Id. at 139
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 137 (citing Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 71, art 25(1)(b)).
90. Vade Mecum, supra note 24, at 252.
91. See TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 22, at 138 (“In situations in which the exact nature or
origin of a cyber incident is unclear, cyber measures may be justified on the basis of the plea of
necessity.”).
92. Schmitt,”Virtual” Disenfranchisement, supra note 21, at 65.
93. See Schmitt, Grey Zones, supra note 57, at 14 (“Agreement on a bright line test for qualification
of non-destructive or injurious cyber operations as a use of force proved elusive.”).
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of this measure, it is not a desirable legal option to pursue as a matter of
policy. First, the Russian hack and accompanying operations in 2016 very
likely infringed on an “essential interest” of the United States. It is
reasonable to argue that the election of the highest political office of the
country falls into that category. The plea of necessity does not require State
entities themselves to be the target of the operation. Therefore, although the
hacked servers were privately owned, one can still argue that the uncorrupted
operation of the major political parties in the United States serves as a crucial
national interest.
The more serious problem arises in the “grave and imminent peril”
requirement. The immediate effects of the Russian operation are still up for
debate. On the government side, although President Trump has been denying
the operation’s effect on the outcome of the 2016 election,94 the intelligence
community has not yet officially provided any definite answers. The ODNI
Report explicitly stated that it “did not make an assessment of the impact that
Russian activities had on the outcomes of the 2016 election.”95 Nongovernment commentators are also divided on the issue: while most
observers have remained agnostic about the actual effects of the Russian
operation,96 some analysts have only recently started to explicitly assert the
high likelihood that the election result was altered by the Russian election
meddling.97 Without an unequivocal causal link between the interference and
the harm, it is difficult for the United States to declare that the Russian
operation has undermined its election system of the United States in a
fundamental way, therefore amounting to a “grave and imminent peril” and
justifying the United States to launch a response measure allowed under the
plea of necessity doctrine.98
94. See, e.g., Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Feb. 17, 2018, 8:22 PM),
https://perma.cc/M4HG-UJR6 (“General McMaster forgot to say that the results of the 2016 election were
not impacted or changed by the Russians and that the only Collusion was between Russia and Crooked
H, the DNC and the Dems. Remember the Dirty Dossier, Uranium, Speeches, Emails and the Podesta
Company!”); see also Jane Mayer, How Russia Helped Swing the Election for Trump, THE NEW YORKER,
Sept. 2018 (observing that in public, President Trump “has characterized all efforts to investigate the
foreign attacks on American democracy during the campaign as a ‘witch hunt’ . . . [and] insisted that ‘the
Russians had no impact on our votes whatsoever’”).
95. OFFICE OF THE DIR. OF NAT’L INTELLIGENCE, BACKGROUND TO “ASSESSING RUSSIAN
ACTIVITIES AND INTENTIONS IN RECENT US ELECTIONS”: THE ANALYTIC PROCESS AND CYBER
INCIDENT ATTRIBUTION, at i (2017).
96. See, e.g., Nate Silver, How Much Did Russian Interference Affect The 2016 Election?,
FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Feb. 16, 2018), https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/how-much-did-russianinterference-affect-the-2016-election/.
97. See, e.g., KATHLEEN HALL JAMIESON, CYBERWAR – HOW RUSSIAN HACKERS AND TROLLS
HELPED ELECT A PRESIDENT: WHAT WE DON’T, CAN’T, AND DO KNOW 15–16 (2018) (listing several
ways Russia attempted to influence the outcome of the 2016 Presidential Election).
98. See TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 22, at 136 (stating that the grave and imminent peril
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There is one potential argument supporting the notion that the Russian
operation caused a “grave and imminent peril” to an essential U.S. interest:
the infringement on the U.S.’ election system is fundamental because the
2016 Russian interference will erode the confidence in the democratic
system in the long term.99 This argument would also satisfy the “imminence”
requirement by citing the ICJ’s Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project interpretation
of imminence,100 showing that a certain and grave danger is impending if no
action is taken immediately. Once the imminence requirement is met, it
would be easier for the decision-makers to argue that the specific measure(s)
they chose are the only one(s) available to prevent Russia from initiating
further similar operations.
Although this argument could allow the United States to invoke the plea
of necessity and, therefore, take much stronger measures than retorsion to
respond to the Russian operation, it is not a desirable policy choice because
it will invite State actors to abuse the rule, leading to escalation of conflict
in cyberspace. If the United States were to resort to the plea of necessity
under the argument mentioned above, the United States is creating a very
flexible standard as precedent. The ICJ’s Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project
interpretation of imminence potentially allows the State to take actions that
would violate international law by claiming that doing so is necessary to
prevent a harm in the relatively distant future.101 There has not been any
opinio juris with regard to the plea of necessity in the cyber context. If the
United States sets a precedent with such a flexible standard, it would almost
certainly invite abuse from other State actors, including adversaries of the
United States. A world where States could easily obtain justifications of both
cyber and kinetic operations under international law would become more
susceptible to escalation of cyber conflicts, bringing greater danger to
element requires that the peril be “especially severe”).
99. The intelligence community does have evidence to show that the election meddling seems to
be a long-term tactic by the Russian government and more attempts are happening. See Ashish Kumar
Sen, Director of National Intelligence Dan Coats: Russia is Attempting to Influence US Midterms, Divide
Transatlantic Alliance, ATLANTIC COUNCIL (June 9, 2018), http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/newatlanticist/director-of-national-intelligence-dan-coats-russia-is-attempting-to-influence-us-midtermsdivide-transatlantic-alliance (“Coats said Russia had already undertaken an ‘unprecedented influence
campaign to interfere in the US electoral and political process’ in 2016.”); see also Government’s Motion
for a Protective Order Under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16(d)(1) at 7, United States v. Concord
Mgmt. & Consulting LLC, 385 F. Supp. 3d 69 (D.D.C. 2019) (Crim. No. 18-cr-32-2 (DLF)) (“[T]he
substance of the government’s evidence identifies uncharged individuals and entities that the government
believes are continuing to engage in interference operations like those charged in the present
indictment.”).
100. See TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 22, at 138 (citing to Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros
acknowledging that “the harm in question could occur ‘in the long term’”).
101. Christian Schaller, Beyond Self-Defense and Countermeasures: A Critical Assessment of the
Tallinn Manual’s Conception of Necessity, 95 TEX. L. REV. 1619, 1633–34 (2017).
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everyone connected to the cyberspace.
In conclusion, the plea of necessity is not, and should not be, a legal
tool available for U.S. decision-makers addressing the Russian election
meddling operation. I now turn to the third kind of response measure
available in international law: countermeasures.
D. Alternative Legal Options: Countermeasures
Countermeasures are State actions that “would otherwise be contrary to
the international obligations of an injured State vis-a-vis the responsible
State, if they were not taken by the former in response to an internationally
wrongful act by the latter in order to procure cessation and reparation.” 102
Countermeasures are responses to internationally wrongful acts attributed to
State actors.103 They are different from the plea of necessity, which does not
require the injured State to either identify an international wrongdoing or
attribute the wrongdoing to a State actor before taking action. The plea of
necessity excuses the injured State from imposing otherwise wrongful
actions against States not responsible for the injury, as long as the condition
precedents are met.104 In contrast, victim states can only impose
countermeasures on responsible States.105
In this section, I will first discuss the legal limitations and advantages
of countermeasures. Next, I will explore the legal issues associated with
attribution, and then examine two different types of wrongdoings under
international law: violation of sovereignty and prohibited intervention. These
are the claims that the United States could allege against Russia to employ
countermeasures. I conclude, in this section, that countermeasures would not
be available to the United States as a response to the Russian operation in
2016 as a matter of international law because the United States would not be
able to establish that the Russian government has committed legal
wrongdoings, a requirement for imposing countermeasures.
1. Legal Limitations and Practical Advantages of Countermeasures
There are many legal restrictions to employing countermeasures. First,
to be consistent with the United Nations Charter’s general mission of
102. Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 71, at 128; TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 22,
at 111. See also Nicaragua, supra note 38, at 127.
103. Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 71, art. 22.
104. See TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 22, at 114 (stating that countermeasures must be used
to respond to actions “attributable to a State, while acts pursuant to the plea of necessity must be taken in
response to the cyber operation of non-State actors (or even the author of the act is unidentified.)” This
means the pleas of necessity, unlike countermeasures, do not have a limitation on the target of the
response measures.
105. Id.
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minimizing escalation, international law does not permit violent
countermeasures: “Countermeasures shall not affect . . . the obligation to
refrain from the threat or use of force as embodied in the Charter of the
United Nations.”106 Therefore, reciprocal violent countermeasures in
response to a prohibited use of force would also be illegal under Article 2(4)
of the United Nations Charter.107
Non-violent countermeasures are also subject to limitations. First, the
purpose of countermeasures may not be retaliation or punishment.108 Rather,
countermeasures must be designed to put a stop to the unlawful operation
and seek assurances (communication by the responsible State that the
unlawful act will cease and not be repeated), guarantees (measures designed
to ensure non-repetition), or reparations (including restitution,
compensation, and apology) from the wrongdoer.109 Therefore, an injured
State may not employ countermeasures in response to a wrongful act that has
ceased and is unlikely to happen again.110 In the cyber context, a classic
example of an appropriate countermeasure would be that the victim State
initiates a cyber operation designed to end an ongoing malicious cyber
operation from the aggressor State.111
Furthermore, countermeasures must also be proportionate to the injury
to which they respond.112 The “injury” here refers to the damage that the
victim State suffered from the wrongdoer’s breach of an international
obligation (such as engaging in prohibited intervention and violating
sovereignty that will be discussed later) that justifies the victim employing
proportionate countermeasures against the wrongdoer.113
Despite these limitations, countermeasures do carry significant
advantages as an option of responding to malicious cyber operations. First,
countermeasures may be directed at targets other than the entity that actually

106. Id. art. 50.
107. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 22, at r. 22, cmt. 11 (noting that the majority of experts
consider “the obligation to refrain from the use of force” to be “a key limitation on an injured State when
conducting countermeasures”).
108. Schmitt, “Virtual” Disenfranchisement, supra note 21, at 65.
109. Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 71, arts. 49–53; TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note
22, rr. 20–25, 27–29; see also Schmitt, “Virtual” Disenfranchisement, supra note 21, at 64 n.162.
110. Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 71, arts. 49(2), 52(3)(a). There are other limitations
not mentioned because they are not relevant to the purpose of this article. For example, “countermeasures
cannot violate fundamental human rights, jus cogens norms, the prohibition on belligerent reprisals, or
dispute settlement procedures.” Rebecca Crootof, International Cybertorts: Expanding State
Accountability in Cyberspace, 103 CORNELL L. REV. 565, 578 n.51 (2018).
111. See Schmitt, “Virtual” Disenfranchisement, supra note 21, at 64–65.
112. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 22, r. 23.
113. Id. at 127.
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carries out the operation that amounts to an internationally wrongful act.114
This means that the United States may respond to the cyber operation
launched by the Russian intelligence agency by hacking back a vulnerable
target in the Russian government. Second, like the plea of necessity,
countermeasures need not be in kind.115 Thus, the United States may respond
to cyber election interference by imposing trade sanctions that might violate
a treaty between the two States.116 Third, compared to the plea of necessity,
the United States would be less likely to create an escalation of conflict in
the international community by setting a precedent of imposing
countermeasures in response to a cyber operation. This is because, different
from the plea of necessity, countermeasures require an attributable
internationally wrongful act from a State actor as a condition precedent,
which is an arguably clearer standard and, therefore, harder for adversaries
of the United States to exploit in the future.
2. Attribution
To establish a basis for countermeasures, the injured State must be able
to make both factual and legal attribution to connect the internationally
wrongful act to the responsible State.117
Factual attribution refers to the degree of certainty that a State is
responsible for a cyber operation.118 Generally, international law requires
States to make determinations on factual matters in a “reasonable”
standard.119 Tallinn Manual 2.0 experts agree that, in the cyber context, if
the injured State is mistaken in its factual attribution and imposes
countermeasures against a State not responsible for its injury, then the
injured State must take responsibility for its breach of international
obligations.120
Legal attribution considers whether a State is responsible for the cyber
operation committed as a matter of law and is governed by the law of State

114. Id. at 112–13.
115. Id. at 128–29.
116. Schmitt, “Virtual” Disenfranchisement, supra note 21, at 65.
117. Id. at 58–59.
118. Vade Mecum, supra note 24, at 254.
119. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 22, at 81–82 (“Reasonableness is always context dependent.
It depends on such factors as, inter alia, the reliability, quantum, directness, nature (e.g., technical data,
human intelligence), and specificity of the relevant available information when considered in light of the
attendant circumstances and the importance of the right involved.”).
120. See Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 71, art. 49, ¶ 3; TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra
note 22, r. 20, ¶ 16; see also Vade Mecum, supra note 24, at 254 n.66 (explaining the rationale behind the
rule is that “because countermeasures open the door to responses that would otherwise be unlawful[,]
[o]ther states should not be required to bear the risk of mistake, even reasonable ones. . .”).
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responsibility.121 States are responsible for the acts of their organs, including
armed forces, security services, and intelligence agencies.122 An organ of the
State is established either by domestic law or by practice, serving as an
instrument of and in complete dependence on the State.123 GRU would be a
clear example of a State organ as a Russian military intelligence agency. A
State is responsible for an organ’s actions even when the organ agency has
acted beyond its assigned responsibility, as long as the agency is acting in an
official capacity, rather than a private one.124 This means the Russian State
would be responsible for the election meddling, even if the operation was
unauthorized, as long as the operation was not carried out for private
purposes. Under these standards, and in light of the factual findings of the
ODNI Report, Russia is responsible for all cyber operations by GRU, namely
the hacking of the DNC servers and the dissemination of the information
collected.
A State is also responsible for actions taken by actors that are not State
organs when the actions are pursuant to the “instructions of, or under the
direction or control of” the State.125 International law still has significant
gray areas with regard to the exact contour of this rule.126 However, this
Article uses Professor Schmitt’s analysis stating that it is at least reasonable
to attribute the actions of actors other than the organs of States, including the
Internet Research Agency and Russian individuals involved in the social
media operations during the 2016 election, to the Russian government
because they acted under the strict direction of the Russian State in this
incident.127
After attributing the election meddling operation to the Russian
government, the next question is whether any aspect of the operation has
amounted to a breach of an international legal obligation. I will examine the
two legal arguments below that have received the most attention with regard
to the Russian election meddling: violation of sovereignty and illegal
intervention of internal State affairs.

121. Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 71, art. 2.
122. Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 71, art. 4(1); TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 22,
r. 15.
123. Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 71, art. 4, cmt. 9.
124. See id. art 4, cmt. 11.
125. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 22, r. 17(a).
126. See Schmitt, “Virtual” Disenfranchisement, supra note 21, at 58–63 (arguing that a strict
application of the international law standards would make it difficult to conclusively attribute the actions
of the non-state-organ actors during the 2016 Russia operation to the Russian government).
127. Id. at 63.
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3. Breach of Legal Obligations: Violation of Sovereignty
Violating another State’s sovereignty is a breach of an international
obligation, which allows the victim State to respond with
countermeasures.128 It may seem intuitive to accuse the Russian government
of violating the sovereignty of the United States by engaging in cyber
operations that intended to undermine a major national election. However, a
close examination of international law does not support this argument.
Customary international law defines sovereignty as something that
signifies “[i]ndependence in regard to a portion of the globe as the right to
exercise therein, to the exclusion of any other State, the functions of a
State,”129 indicating two major aspects of sovereignty: territorial integrity
and State functions.130 A violation of either aspect amounts to a violation of
State sovereignty.
First, with regard to territorial integrity, Tallinn Manual 2.0 experts
agreed that a remotely conducted cyber operation causing either physical
damage to objects (both private and governmental) or injury to persons
violates sovereignty.131 In the cyber context, damage to objects not only
means physical damage, but also a loss of functionality, as dysfunction of
cyberinfrastructure is often the result of hostile cyber operations.132
However, Tallinn Manual 2.0 experts disagreed on the extent of the loss of
functionality required to qualify as a violation of territorial integrity.133 Some
insisted that there must be an irreversible loss of function, while, for others,
altering or deleting data stored in the cyberinfrastructure would suffice, even
if the loss of functionality might be temporary and restorable.134 An example
of the former position would be the Stuxnet operation, which destroyed
thousands of Iranian centrifuges,135 while a major denial-of-service attack
would suffice the latter position.136 However, with respect to the Russian
election meddling, neither of the positions above are likely to establish a
violation of sovereignty because no known damage or loss of functionality
was caused to information and communication technology in the United
States.
Second, a remote cyber operation amounting to an interference of

128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.

TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 22, r. 20.
Island of Palmas (Neth. v. U.S.), 2 R.I.A.A. 829, 838 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1928).
Schmitt, “Virtual” Disenfranchisement, supra note 21, at 43.
TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 22, at 20.
Id. at 20–21.
Id. at 21.
Id.
Sanger, supra note 42.
TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 22, at 21.
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inherently governmental functions also violates the sovereignty of the victim
State.137 Holding national elections would be a classic example of an
inherently governmental function, which States enjoy the exclusive right to
perform.138
However, as a matter of international law, it is unclear exactly what
cyber activities amount to an illegal “interference” of such function. The
extreme cases are clear. On the one hand, a cyber operation that affects
public voting infrastructures, such as voting machines or voting registration
systems, would be a clear interference of inherently governmental
functions.139 On the other hand, Tallinn Manual 2.0 experts agreed that
political propaganda during foreign elections would not amount to an illegal
interference because prevalent opinio juris does not treat hostile political
propaganda as a violation of sovereignty.140
Given these standards, some aspects of the Russian operation in 2016
were not a violation of the United States’ sovereignty. Examples include the
Russian’s propaganda campaign during the election and the political
advertisements on United States social media platforms.141 A stronger case
might exist with regard to the Russian trolls that used fake, or sometimes
even stolen, American identities to influence American voters. This is
because the Russian trolls manipulated the American electorate’s ability to
assess the messages relevant to their decision-making process.142
However, this is hardly an unassailable argument because it was
ultimately the voter who made up his or her own mind when going to the
polling station. Propaganda and internet trolls are much less severe than an
actual cyber-attack to tamper with voting machines, physically impeding
voters from casting their votes. Furthermore, it seems to be an ill-advised
political strategy to argue that the foreign trolls, as such, have risen to a level
as severe as interfering with a fundamental governmental function because
it would project political weakness, rather than strength. The robustness of
the American liberal democracy has always been its strongest soft power
against authoritarian adversaries like Russia. For that reason, projecting
weakness in the democratic system just to hold Russia accountable under
international law would not sustain a careful cost-benefit scrutiny.
Finally, the hacking of DNC servers would also fail to amount to a
violation of sovereignty because an information-gathering hacking operation
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.

Id. at 21–22.
Schmitt, “Virtual” Disenfranchisement, supra note 21, at 45.
Id. at 46.
TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 22, at 26.
See generally ODNI REPORT, supra note 1.
Schmitt, “Virtual” Disenfranchisement, supra note 21, at 47.
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only amounts to espionage, which is not prohibited per se under international
law.143
In conclusion, the different aspects of the Russian operation in 2016 do
not seem to amount to an illegal violation of sovereignty under international
law. Next, I will examine the argument on illegal intervention.
4. Breach of Legal Obligations: Illegal Intervention
The intervention in another State’s internal affairs is the second
internationally wrongful act that the United States might be able to allege
against Russia in order to use countermeasures. Illegal intervention consists
of two elements under customary international law: (1) the operation must
have an effect on the internal affairs that are part of the victim State’s
domaine reserve and (2) the effect of the operation must be coercive.144
Similar to the violation of sovereignty, an operation of illegal intervention
can target both private and governmental entities145 and can only be
committed by a State actor.146
As the ICJ explained in the Nicaragua judgment, domaine reserve
refers to “matters in which each State is permitted by the principle of
sovereignty, to decide freely. . . . [F]or example, the choice of a political . . .
system.”147 Employing coercive measures regarding such choices amounts
to a wrongful intervention as a matter of international law.148 For the
purposes of this Article, a national election clearly falls into the category of
domaine reserve. The determinative question is whether the Russian election
meddling operation was coercive.
Tallinn Manual 2.0 experts agreed that coercion “refers to an
affirmative act designed to deprive another State of its freedom of choice,
that is, to force that State to act in an involuntary manner or involuntarily
refrain from acting in a particular way.”149 Also, “coercion must be
distinguished from persuasion, criticism, public diplomacy, [and]
propaganda”150 because, different from coercion, “such activities merely
involve either influencing (as distinct from factually compelling) the
voluntary actions of the target State or seek no action on the part of the target
143. See TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 22, at 168–74 (discussing Rule 32 regarding peacetime
cyber espionage).
144. See Schmitt, “Virtual” Disenfranchisement, supra note 21, at 48.
145. See TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 22, at 315–16 (discussing the example of attacking
another State’s commercial banks).
146. Schmitt, “Virtual” Disenfranchisement, supra note 21, at 48.
147. Nicaragua, supra note 38, ¶ 205.
148. Id.
149. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 22, at 317.
150. Id. at 318.
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State at all.”151 The exact standard of coercion, however, is still
underdeveloped. Just like the violation of sovereignty, the extreme cases on
both ends of the spectrum are clear: in the election context, an attack
disabling the voting infrastructure to prevent voters from casting their ballots
would be an example of coercion, while mere espionage or propaganda
campaigns would not amount to prohibited intervention as a matter of
international law. 152
Therefore, the hacking of the DNC servers, disseminating the
information collected from the hacking, and the propaganda campaign on
both social media and the Russian State media would not constitute coercive
acts. None of these activities compelled the voters to engage in involuntary
actions or inactions, but, rather, they were simply influencing and persuading
the voters to act in a certain way.
The only activity that arguably amounts to “influencing plus” are the
Russian trolls disguised under fake or stolen American identities.153 This is
because by covering its true identity, the troll operation impeded the
American electorate’s ability to consider the source of information that
influences their decision-making process, therefore distorting their ability to
control their own governance.154 However, even if this can be established,
the United States might still have a hard time holding Russia accountable
under the non-intervention framework because the United States did not
come to this issue with clean hands.
The “clean-hands principle” under international law means a State
cannot make claims against another State when the former is guilty of the
same offense against the latter because international obligations are
reciprocal in nature.155 When it comes to election meddling, the United States
has been accused of engaging in many massive intervention operations itself.
Some studies show that the United States intervened in elections of other
States on more than eighty occasions between 1946 and 2000.156 In the
specific case of Russia, it is alleged that the United States saved its preferred
151. Id. at 318–19.
152. Schmitt, “Virtual” Disenfranchisement, supra note 21, at 50.
153. Id. at 51.
154. Id.
155. Judge Hudson articulated the definition of the “clean-hand” principle in his Individual Opinion
in the River Meuse Case before the International Court of Justice: “[i]t would seem . . . that where two
parties have assumed an identical or a reciprocal obligation, one party which is engaged in a continuing
non-performance of that obligation should not be permitted to take advantage of a similar nonperformance of that obligation by the other party.” Diversion of Water from the River Meuse (Neth. v.
Belg.), Judgement, 1937 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 70, ¶ 323 (June 28).
156. Nina Agrawal, The US Is No Stranger to Interfering in the Elections of Other Countries, L.A.
TIMES (Dec. 21, 2016), http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-us-intervention-foreign-elections20161213-story.html.
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candidate, Boris Yeltsin, from near defeat by intervening in the 1996
presidential election.157 The Russian State media has also accused the United
States of attempting to intervene in the 2011 parliamentary elections in
Russia.158 Although the clean-hands principle has not been conclusively
accepted as a valid defense in international law,159 it can create more
application difficulties, if the United States attempts to respond to the Russia
election meddling via countermeasures on the basis of illegal intervention.
Countermeasures provide many advantages as a response measure.
However, in the specific case of the Russian election meddling, there is no
solid legal argument available to establish a breach of a legal obligation to
justify using them.
This section examined most major alternative response measures
available to the United States facing the Russian election meddling operation
in the context of Tallinn Manual 2.0. It shows that, other than retorsion, the
Obama administration did not and the Trump administration does not have
an alternative response measure available that is legally unassailable.
Furthermore, even when using stretched legal argument to justify the use of
these alternative measures, the alternative measures are politically
undesirable. Therefore, even though no one seems satisfied with how the
United States has been responding to the Russian election meddling, the
argument that the United States should hit back harder does not have any
grounds as a matter of international law.
That said, I do believe there are measures the United States can take to
avoid further election meddling similar to the Russian operation in 2016. In
the following section, I will discuss why I believe a practical solution at this
point would not be based on international law, but foreign policy.
III. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION
In this section, I conclude by arguing that a practical course of action
for the United States in defending itself against hostile cyber operations like
the 2016 Russian election meddling is to make a clear policy declaration.
This declaration should specify what kind of cyber operations the United
States will not engage in against other States and, at the same time, will not
157. Markar Melkonian, US Meddling in 1996 Russian Elections in Support of Boris Yeltsin,
GLOBAL RESEARCH (Jan. 13, 2017), https://www.globalresearch.ca/us-meddling-in-1996-russianelections-in-support-of-boris-yeltsin/5568288.
158. Robert Bridge, Election-meddling Fiasco Hits US-Russia Relations, RUSSIA TODAY (Dec. 9,
2011), https://www.rt.com/russia/russia-us-elections-clinton-putin-2012-usaid-427/.
159. See Patrick C. R. Terry, “Don’t Do as I Do”—The US Response to Russian and Chinese Cyber
Espionage and Public International Law, 19 GERMAN L.J. 613, 624 (2018) (“Whether the clean-handsprinciple has actually developed into a rule of customary international law—as a wholesale preclusion or
as a factor in assessing the admissibility of a claim put forward by an injured State—is contentious.”).
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tolerate if these operations are launched against the United States. For
example, the United States can declare that it will refrain from meddling in
the elections of other States via cyber means and simultaneously not tolerate
any election meddling operations against the United States, regardless of
international law’s characterization of the operation. This would be an effort
of unilateral arms control that respects the international law norm of
reciprocal obligations.160
The measure previously described is an idea inspired by Professor Jack
Goldsmith, who argued that the United States should consider signing an
agreement of mutual restraint with its adversaries on certain types of cyber
operations, such as election meddling, in exchange for a cease-fire in these
areas because they are just so damaging and hard to deter.161 In my opinion,
it is hard to know if a cyber “arms control” agreement with Russia proposed
by Professor Goldsmith would be practical in the short term because both
countries have different opinions on cyber laws and a negotiation on an
agreement like this will likely expose the cyber capabilities of the United
States. However, I do believe it is extremely important for the United States
to at least unilaterally clarify in a public declaration what it will and will not
do with its cyber capabilities, which would have the following two benefits.
First, such a declaration would bring clarity that international law has
failed to provide. The international law analysis in this Article confirms one
prevalent notion in the academic community of international law and cyber
conflict, that is, the lex lata international law carries substantial gray areas.
The legal uncertainty in this area creates fertile grounds for exploitation, the
Russian election meddling being just one example of many, and it is
occurring at a growing frequency.162 The lack of clarity by itself invites more
conflicts because parties exploiting the system will make more attempts to
explore where the boundaries are. If the “rules of the game” have more
clarity, fewer operations would be launched because the cost-benefit analysis
would be clearer for adversaries contemplating an operation. Furthermore,
more clarity also decreases the chances of escalation and decreases the
chances of misinterpretation of actions.
Second, a self-restraint on crucial areas of cyber operation fits today’s
political reality. The first reality is that although the United States remains

160. Vade Mecum, supra note 24, at 252 (pointing out that international law seeks balance between
obligations and responsibilities between equal sovereignties).
161. Jack Goldsmith, Contrarian Thoughts on Russia and the Presidential Election, LAWFARE (Jan
10, 2017), https://www.lawfareblog.com/contrarian-thoughts-russia-and-presidential-election.
162. See generally DAVID SANGER, THE PERFECT WEAPON: WAR, SABOTAGE, AND FEAR IN THE
CYBER AGE 295–309 (2018) [hereinafter SANGER, THE PERFECT WEAPON].
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the world’s strongest, most skillful, and stealthiest cyber power,163 it is also
among the most vulnerable ones when facing a hostile cyber operation.164
This is mainly because the United States is among one of the most connected
and digitalized countries, which creates more targets for our adversaries to
attack.165 Also, in the context of election meddling, being a liberal
democracy that protects free speech in the cyberspace could be a
vulnerability when facing an authoritarian adversary like Russia because a
liberal democracy would have a much harder time containing false
information in the age of social media.166 The second reality is that the United
States is not even close to having a perfect defense system in cyberspace.167
This is partly due to the nature of cyber conflict. As Rebecca Croot
articulated, “[d]efenders are playing an elaborate game of whack-a-mole,
where a single missed attack can have devastating effects.”168
Before raising an effective defense against high-stakes attacks is
achievable, the only option left is deterrence. The United States’ efforts thus
far in building deterrence do not seem to be effective.169 Publicly identifying
specific high-stake areas, like elections and critical infrastructures, that the
United States will not tolerate as targets of a hostile cyber operation as a
matter of policy would enable the United States to employ response
measures that might otherwise not be available under international law. This
would better deter similar election meddling operations in the future because
the United States could employ more severe and sophisticated response
measures.
The specifics of this proposed unilateral declaration, however, are
beyond the scope of this paper and require further examination. What this
Article tries to show is that current international law does not support the
popular “we-should-hit-back-harder” argument in light of the Russia
election interference. Response measures available in international law are,
by nature, reactive, and the laws regulating them contain substantial gray
areas prone to exploitation. To create a more effective deterrence

163. Joe Uchill, Obama: US Government Has Largest Capacity to Hack, THE HILL (Sept. 6, 2016),
https://thehill.com/policy/cybersecurity/294572-obama-us-has-largest-cyber-capacity.
164. See generally Jack Goldsmith & Stuart Russell, Strengths Become Vulnerabilities: How a
Digital World Disadvantages the United States in Its International Relations, HOOVER INST. (2018),
https://www.hoover.org/sites/default/files/research/docs/381100534-strengths-becomevulnerabilities.pdf.
165. See id.
166. See id.
167. See Goldsmith, supra note 161; see also SANGER, THE PERFECT WEAPON, supra note 162, at
308.
168. Crootof, supra note 110, at 580.
169. Goldsmith, supra note 161.

XIAO (DO NOT DELETE)

378

DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW

5/16/2020 9:11 AM

[Vol 30:349

mechanism, we should consider options outside of international law.

